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THE PHILIPPINES: RECENT PERFORMANCE, 
PROSPECTS FOR 1991-92, AND 
POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES* 
Josef T. Yap** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments have put the Philippine economy at 
the threshold of another Balance-of-Payments (BOP) crisis. 
Several months after barely surviving a coup attempt in the 
latter part of 1989, the Aquino government had its hands 
full trying to wrestle with a crippling power shortage. 
Authorities were quick to blame the prevailing drought at 
that time which already had adverse effects on agricultural 
production. Just as electricity supply was returning to 
normal, a disastrous earthquake struck the northern part of 
Luzon island claiming 1,500 lives and causing much property 
damage. Then in August, Iraq invaded Kuwait causing the 
price of oil to double and since that time, domestic fuel 
prices have more than doubled. As if these were not enough, 
a secessionist attempt was staged in the island of Mindanao 
underscoring the disharmony in the armed forces. 
*Prepared for the Third Workshop on the Asian Economic 
Outlook and World Project LINK Conference sponsored by the 
Asian Development Bank, 5-9 November 1990, Manila. 
••Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development 
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Preliminary data on the economic performance in 1990 
corroborate the unfavorable nature of the effects of these 
setbacks. The GNP growth rate fell to a dismal 3.4 percent 
during the first semester of 1990 after posting an 
encouraging 5.7 percent growth during the first quarter. 1/ 
Because of the drought, the agriculture sector experienced 
the biggest slack with a growth rate of 0.17 percent 
compared to 4.25 percent registered for the same period last 
year. The peso has depreciated sharply in the third quarter 
mainly as a result of the ballooning trade deficit which 
stood at $1.87 billion as of July 1990 and is expected to 
reach $3.8 billion at the end of the year. The government's 
budget deficit is expected to widen from P20 billion last 
year to P35 billion in 1990 and, as a consequence, interest 
rates have shot up to nearly 30 percent with inflation 
measured on an annual basis posting double-digit figures for 
more than a year now. 
Admittedly, the exogenous shocks have inflicted much 
damage to the economy. But lest one allows these events to 
dominate his comprehension of the current state of the 
economy, one should be reminded that as early as the first 
semester of 1989, the economy had already been exhibiting 
signs of deceleration. Table 1 presents some economic 
indicators for the years 1982, 1983, and 1989 and the period 
1986-88 together with preliminary data and projections for 
1990. While the 1989 GNP growth rate of 5.67 percent is 
highetr than the average for 1986-88, this figure is still 
below the government target of 6.5 percent. Moreover, the 
GNP growth rate in the previous year was 6.74 percent and 
the prognosis for the economy in 1990, even prior to the 
December putsch, was 5.5 percent at best. 
A major cause of concern is the current account 
balance. After averaging a surplus equivalent to 0.3 
percent of GNP for the period 1986-88, the current account 
has begun to rapidly deteriorate again, posting a deficit 
equivalent to 3.3 percent of GNP in 1989. This is expected 
to reach 6.8 percent in 1990, a figure which ranks behind 
only the 1982 and 1983 levels which are the highest in the 
past two decades. Inflation has reached a double-digit 
figure in 1989 after being contained in the first three 
years of the Aquino administration. Despite this surge in 
prices, real interest rates continued to climb steadily, 
hitting 8.7 percent in 1989 and 10.3 percent during the 
first three quarters of 1990, after dropping to 5.9 percent 
in 1988. This reflects the tight monetary policy stance of 
the Central Bank and the substantial borrowing of the 
lyGDP, however, grew by 4.56 percent in the first 
quarter, down from the year-ago figure of 5.04 percent. 
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Table 1 
BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
19B2 1983 1986-1988 
Average 
1989 1990 
First Sea. Projection 
1. 6NP growth rate 1.90 1.11 4.81 5.67 3.40 3.13 
GDP growth rate 2.90 0.93 4.13 5.61 2.69 2.47 
2. CURBAL/GNPt 8.15 8.07 0.33 3.31 5.31 6.65 
3. DEF6/GNPN 7.31 1.96 3.46 2.01 3.61 4.02 
4. X$ growth rate (12.25) (0.32) 15.47 10.56 3.72 3.80 
S. Inflation 10.21 10.17 4.43 10.60 12.52 t 12.78 
6. Real interest rate 2.40 4.00 9.10 8.73 10.35 11.46 
7. Depreciation rate 8.11 30.13 4.34 3.03 7.48 t 11.46 
8. Debt/GNPNt 62.83 72.81 83.02 62.44 - 61.42 
9. Ter«5 of trade 0.59 0.61 0.66 0.71 - -
* Third Quarter 1989-1990 
Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board; 
Central Bank 
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government in the domestic market primarily to finance its 
burgeoning deficit. After posting significant gains in the 
past with the deficit-GNP ratio falling to 2.0 percent in 
1989 after averaging 3.4 percent in 1986-88, the deficit has 
begun to swell again and is expected to settle at 3.7 
percent of GNP in 1990. What makes this prediction even 
more troubling is that the original target for this year was 
less than one percent. 
Figure 1 should help elaborate the matter of the 
unsustainability of the recent growth path. The graph shows 
the close correlation between the GNP growth rate and net 
capital flows including interest payments on the external 
debt especially during the period 1979-85. This is evidence 
of the country's heavy reliance on foreign financing to prop 
up the economy. During the mid-70s, the economy was 
experiencing what many economists have described as debt-led 
growth. After the second oil shock in 1979 and the 
subsequent recession in the industrialized countries, net 
flows turned negative and as a consequence, the economy 
began to lose steam. The effects of past policy decisions 
began to be felt particularly in the external sector as the 
traded goods sector could not provide a cushion against this 
decline. The political turmoil in 1983 only expedited the 
BOP crisis and the 1984-85 recession. 
Despite the continuing net capital outflows, the 
economy showed signs of recovery in 1986-1989. This has 
been a result of several factors. First and foremost were 
the government pump-priming activities which led to a surge 
in consumer spending. Inflation was contained because of 
the existing underutilized capacity, a product of the 
contraction in aggregate demand in 1983-85. Economic 
reforms, particularly the dismantling of agriculture 
monopolies which led to higher rural incomes and the import 
liberalization program which lowered the prices of several 
commodities, helped fuel this consumption binge. Terms of 
trade were favorable from 1987-89 mainly due to the drop in 
oil prices. Exports grew at an average of 14.2 percent, 
slightly higher than the historical average of 12 percent. 
A third factor that aided the recovery was the surge in 
foreign investment facilitated by the debt conversion 
schemes being implemented at that time. It is suspected 
that a considerable portion of the investment coursed 
through the debt swap mechanisms was returning capital 
flight. Foreign remittances during this time were also high 
although this trend had started as early as 1982. A less 
tangible, albeit equally important, factor was the generally 
buoyant mood after Ferdinand Marcos left the country. At 
that time, Corazon Aquino enjoyed widespread support and 
also wielded a great deal of moral influence. 
5 
Figure 1 
GNP and Net Receipts w / Int. Payments 
• GNP real growth (X) + Net w/lnt.fOOOO*) 
Sources of Basic Data: National Statistical Coordination Board; 
Central Bank; and 
Lee and David (19901 
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Unfortunately, these conditions which have been 
favorable to the growth of the economy are no longer 
present. Excess capacity has been exhausted and as a 
result, inflation has been rising. Terms of trade have taken 
a turn for the worse mainly because of the rise in world oil 
prices. With the current stalemate in the Middle East, 
there is no immediate relief in sight. Export performance 
has been sluggish defying the optimism of the trade 
secretary. With the major industrialized countries on the 
brink of a recession, foreign investment cannot be relied 
upon as a major source of external capital flows. Finally, 
confidence in the ability of the present government to lead 
this country to NIE status has plummeted resulting in deep 
fragmentation of the body politic. It may just be this 
factor that could prove to be the biggest obstacle to 
economic development. 
Thus, not unlike the Aquino assassination in 1983, the 
recent crises have only served to hasten the decline, 
exposing the fragile state of the economy. In a sense, we 
have reverted to the downward sloping portion of the growth 
curve in Figure 1. Worse, it is evident that we have not 
outgrown the boom-bust syndrome (De Dios and Bautista 1990) 
that has plagued the country approximately every 8-10 years 
since the last world w a r . The cyclical nature of the BOP 
crises stems from the inability of all administrations, past 
and present, to implement fundamental economic reforms. 
Even with this rather bleak scenario, it would be 
difficult to dismiss the Philippines as a basket case. 
Aside from the obvious potential of the economy in terms of 
its natural resources and availability of skilled manpower, 
two more recent developments provide some encouragement. 
First, even prior to the latest oil crisis, key policy 
reforms had been approved, although with the advent of the 
crises, some of these have been derailed. The second piece 
of encouraging news is that in the aftermath of the 
earthquake and the jump in oil prices, financial aid from 
both bilateral and multilateral sources may in fact be 
stepped up, or at least disbursed more quickly than in the 
past. 2/ 
The crucial issue that must be promptly addressed is 
the availability of foreign finance over the short-term 
which is necessary in order to prevent a recession similar 
to 1984-85. Bilateral and multilateral institutions have 
minced no words in making it clear that such financing is 
contingent on a number of economic reforms. A genuinely 
reform-minded government, however, must also be prepared to 
2/Quoted heavily from "Asian Economic Commentary 
(Philippines)," Merryl Lynch, September 1990. 
7 
accept lower growth during the initial stages of reform 
because industrial restructuring and agrarian reform will 
cause disruptions and necessitate establishment of new 
institutions (Montes 1990). 
It is against this background that this paper would 
attempt to forecast economic performance in the next two 
years. In Section II/ more details regarding the trends in 
1990 are presented. The prospects for the next two years 
are presented in Section III. Section IV discusses policy 
debates that have cropped up since 1989 and also analyzes 
critical development issues for 1991 and 1992. General 
conclusions are made in the last section. 
I I . RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A . Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance 
A significant deceleration in the growth of the 
Philippine economy was registered for the first semester of 
1990. Real Gross National Product (GNP) posted a 3.4 
percent growth, about two percentage points lower than the 
same period last year. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) posted 
an increment of 2.7 percent, a much slower growth compared 
to the concurrent GNP growth and to the GDP growth 
registered during the same period last year. The slower 
growth of GDP resulted largely on account of supply side 
shocks, more important of which were the drought which hit 
the agricultural sector and power outages which disrupted 
the industrial sector. Growth in GNP was cushioned somewhat 
by increased inflows of remittances of overseas workers and 
by substantial interest payment reductions due to the debt 
buybacks. However, these were not enough to dispel the 
negative effects of both political uncertainty engendered by 
the December 1989 coup and macroeconomic imbalances 
reflected in higher prices and interest rates. The full 
effects of such shocks were intensely felt in the second 
quarter, as aggregate growth slowed down to 1.12 percent 
from 5.7 percent in the first quarter. 
The effects of high prices and interest rates which are 
reflective of the continuation of macroeconomic imbalances 
will continue to be felt in the second semester. This is as 
long as structural reforms and adjustment policies designed 
to strengthen the domestic economy and improve the country's 
competitiveness are not enacted. The prospects for such 
measures remain dim, however, as adverse developments in the 
second half of the year make such adjustments even more 
difficult. The damages on infrastructure brought by the 
July 16 earthquake necessitate additional expenditures on 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of productive capacity. 
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The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2 has led to sharp 
increases in oil prices, a development which threatens to 
worsen the slowdown in the world economy. Inflationary 
pressures have also been heightened as domestic adjustment 
in petroleum product prices followed the increases in crude 
oil prices. 
Given this scenario, however, full year growth of GNP 
is expected to remain at 3.1 percent while GDP growth is 
expected at 2.5 percent. This is on account of the 
alleviation of the power shortage in the first semester and 
a slight recovery of the agricultural sector. On the 
expenditure side, the seasonal second semester increase in 
consumption expenditures is expected to sustain growth. 
Of the components of aggregate demand, it was only 
total consumption spending which posted a slightly higher 
growth of 6.0 percent in the first semester, up from 5.7 
percent in the same period last year. Much of this is 
attributed to the accelerated pace of private consumption 
which grew at 6.2 percent. This was an offshoot of the 
higher purchasing power brought on by a 39 percent increase 
in the minimum wage. Increases in consumption were also 
fueled by inflationary expectations as consumers tried to 
stock up on basic commodities. 
Government consumption posted a decelerated growth of 
5.2 percent. Higher compensation indices together with no 
mandated salary increase for government employees resulted 
in slower real increases in government consumption. For the 
y e a r , total consumption is expected to grow by 5.9 percent 
on account of a 6.1 percent growth for private consumption 
and a 3.6 percent growth in government consumption. Private 
consumption expenditures usually kick during the second 
semester due to holiday spending although such may be lesser 
as higher prices persist. However, consumption of basic 
goods may be sustained to the extent that price controls are 
effective. •• A slower government consumption growth i-s 
expected as economy measures in government operations as 
contained in Administrative Order No. 177 take effect. 
These measures include, among others, the suspension of 
athletic, cultural, sports and public relations activities 
funded out of agency appropriations, the limitations On the 
filling up of vacant positions, and the freeze on salary 
increases. 
On the production side, a sharp deceleration in both 
agricultural and industrial output was registered. From a 
4.2 percent growth in the first semester of 1989, 
agricultural, fishery and forestry growth dropped to 0.2 
percent. Industry growth was halved from 6.9 percent in the 
first half of 1989 to 3.4 percent in this year. Services 
grew by 3.6 percent, down from the 5.9 percent growth 
registered last year. 
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It was the 4.8 percent decline in the value added of 
the crops subsector which substantially decreased total 
agricultural production in the first semester. A prolonged 
dry spell which started in November 1989 brought severe 
damage to crop production , as evidenced by an almost 12 
percent decline in the volume of palay production, and about 
nine percent decline in corn production. The substantial 25 
percent increases in palay and corn farmgate prices were not 
enough to offset the drop in production. Except for coconut 
and pineapple which posted modest gains, all other major 
crops posted declines.: On a quarterly basis, all the major 
crops except corn buffered a deceleration in the growth of 
gross value-added during the second quarter. 
These developments have led to massive grain 
importations for the first semester in order to prevent 
shortages and upsurges in grain prices. About 600,000 
metric tons of rice have already been brought in, nearly 
thrice the level of rice imports for the whole of 1989. 
This move was aimed to supplement the buffer stocks of rice 
which stood at 65 days as of the first semester 1990. 
Providing contrast to the crop subsector performance 
were the robust growth posted by livestock and poultry and 
fishery subsectors of 10.1 percent and 4.3 percent, 
respectively. These trends were partly occasioned by a 
significant appreciation of average unit prices of 19.3 
percent for livestock, 13.7 percent for poultry and 4.7 
percent for fishery products. H o g , goats, dairy and chicken 
production all posted accelerated growth relative to 
comparable figures last year. Commercial and aquaculture 
fisheries performed well, with the growing demand for 
seaweed products partly offsetting the decreasing trend in 
shrimps and prawn-production. 
The agricultural sector is expected to post a modest 
0.6 percent growth for the year. There are indications of a 
modest recovery in the crops sector as reports of a bumper 
harvest in corn come in, and as sugar prices remain high. 
The results of the rice fertilizer subsidy affecting the 
April and November plantings are expected to be felt 
starting in the second semester. Livestock and poultry and 
fishery growth are expected to be sustained. 
The manufacturing sector bore the brunt of adverse 
supply and demand factors which led to a lackluster growth 
of 2.4 percent for the first semester as compared with the 
5.8 percent growth during the same period last year. The 
five largest subsectors (food manufactures, electrical 
machinery, footwear and wearing apparel, chemicals and basic 
metals) registered a low growth of 2.9 percent as against 
4.2 percent in 1989. 
On the supply side, the frequent power outages 
especially in the second quarter led to lower petroleum 
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product consumption of the industrial sector. Despite 
efforts to minimize brownouts in industrial areas, the 
brownouts still took a heavy toll as evidenced by the 
contraction of eleven manufacturing subsectors. 
Manufacturing firms were also beset by high costs of 
production as minimum wages increased by 39 percent and as 
the cost of capital as proxied by the 91~day Treasury Bill 
rate rose by almost 610 basis points (i.e., from 16.2 
percent to 22.3 percent) from the comparable semester last 
year. Inadequate and unstable supply of raw materials, in 
particular foodstuffs, also led to decreased production. On 
the demand side, the downtrend in export demand due to the 
slowdown in the world economy and the deterioration in the 
terms of trade also pulled down manufacturing production 
especially those of manufactured exports such as semi-
conductors. 
Reversing the 2.2 percent decline posted in the first 
semester of 1989, the mining and quarrying subsector posted 
a 1.8 percent increase. The recovery of copper production 
spurred such increase. From an 8.6 percent drop recorded in 
the first semester of the previous y e a r , the red metal 
posted an increase of 2.9 percent. A significant increase 
of 25.0 percent was also recorded in chromite production, 
adding impetus to the sector's recovery. However, declining 
gold prices and consequent decline in gold production 
prevented the sector from attaining a higher growth rate. 
Growth of the construction subsector decelerated from 
the 15.9 percent registered in the first semester of 1989 to 
about 7.9 percent this y e a r . High interest rates and the 
lack of power contributed to the deceleration. This was most 
felt during the second quarter as private construction 
slowed down relative to the first quarter. The sustained 
pace of government construction owing to efforts at 
accelerating the implementation of infrastructure projects 
served to maintain public construction growth for the first 
two quarters. 
In spite of the numerous brownouts which occurred 
during the period, the utilities subsector still managed to 
grow by 4.5 percent. Gross electric generation increased by 
3.4 percent to 737 million barrels of fuel oil equivalent in 
the first half of 1990. Increasing dependency on oil 
resulted partly from the drought which reduced electric 
generation from hydro sources by 14.6 percent. 
Continued recovery of the mining and quarrying 
subsector is expected to boost industrial output to 2.1 
percent for the whole year. 
Following the overall slowdown of the agriculture and 
industrial sectors, the service sector grew modestly at 3.6 
percent. All subsectors experienced a deceleration in the 
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expansion. For the whole year, a 4.0 percent growth in 
services is expected. 
B . Employment 
Two hundred eighty-six thousand more people were 
employed domestically in the first seven months of 1990 
relative to the same period in 1989. This translated to a 
marginal decline in the unemployment rate from 8.6 percent 
in 1989 to 8.5 percent in 1990 first semester. Reflecting 
the aggregate performance of the sectors, agriculture's 
share in the total employment declined from 45.2 percent to 
44.2 percent while manufacturing's share declined from 10.7 
percent to 10.2 percent. Utilities' share in the total 
employment remained fairly stable while labor absorption by 
construction increased from 4.1 percent to 4.4 percent. The 
services sector took up the slack as increments in the share 
of total employment were posted by wholesale and retail 
trade, transportation and communication, finance and 
community and other personal services. As a consequence of 
the shift toward these services, the underemployment rate 
for the first seven months increased from 30.2 percent in 
1989 to 30.6 percent in 1990. 
Indicators for the first five months of the year show 
an increase in the number of overseas workers by nine 
percent compared with the same period last year. Of tnose 
deployed to the Middle East, the bulk were sent to Saudi 
Arabia (76.2 percent) while around four percent were bound 
for Iraq and Kuwait* Foreign exchange remittances from these 
OCWs increased by 43.5 percent, from US$357.11 million in 
1989 to US$512.34 this year. 
The repatriation of overseas contract workers from the 
crisis-stricken Middle East and the continued clamor for 
wage increases point to a worsened employment situation for 
the rest of the year. The full time equivalent unemployment 
rate is expected to increase from 19.5 percent in 1989 to 
20.4 percent this year. 
C . Savings and Investment 
A marked slowdown in investment growth was registered 
during the first semester of 1990. From a robust 27.9 
percent growth in the same period last y e a r , investment 
decelerated to about 3.9 percent. This trend was mainly due 
to the large drawdown in stocks as the government resorted 
to its buffer stock of staples to counteract the effects of 
the drought. 
Fixed capital formation growth remained buoyant at 14.2 
percent though at a slower pace than last year's 25.6 
percent. Durable equipment growth led the way with a 16.4 
percent increment. The purchase of power generating 
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equipment by the National Power Corporation and the 
acquisition of two transport aircrafts by the Philippine Air 
Lines powered the growth. Expenditures in public and private 
construction grew by 11.0 and 12.1 percent, respectively. 
On a quarterly basis, a sharp slowdown in investments 
was evident in the second quarter of 1990. Fixed capital 
formation decelerated from 22.1 percent in the first quarter 
to about 6.3 percent in the second, with durable equipment 
slowing down considerably to a 4.4 percent growth in the 
second quarter compared with about 31 percent increase in 
the first. 
Botn economic and non-economic factors accounted for 
these trends. On the economic side, the high cost of 
capital has proven to be a deterrent to further investment 
growth. Increases in lending rates, following those of 
average 91-day Treasury Bill rates, have made costs of 
investments more prohibitive. The same increases in T-bill 
rates may have caused firms to shift from real assets to 
these high-yielding, low-risk government securities. Higher 
costs of inputs, specifically labor inputs on account of 
higher wages may have undermined firm profitability, thereby 
leading firms to scale down or postpone expansion plans. 
The frequent power shortages during the first semester, by 
increasing wastes and production times, also increased costs 
and undermined firm profitability. The low level of foreign 
exchange reserves also constrained the importation of 
machineries and other durable equipment. 
On the non-economic side, local and foreign investor 
bullishness in the economy was severely shaken by the 
aborted coup attempt last December 1989. This has led to 
doubts on the ability of the government to provide a stable 
and peaceful environment for investments. These fears were 
translated instantly to reduced interest in the Philippines 
as an alternative investment site as foreign initial paid-up 
capital; investments'grew only by 6.9 percent. Total 
initial paid-up • capital and' 'additional investments gsew by 
13.5 percent, way below the 80.0 percent registered for the 
same period last year. 
Growth of investments for the whole year is expected at 
about 1.4 percent. Slower private construction growth of 
10.8 percent is expected for the year due to higher cost of 
inputs and interest rates. A slower full year growth of 
16.1 percent for durable equipment is also expected as 
foreign exchange constraints limit importations. Stocks are 
not yet expected to normalize as foreign exchange 
constraints and high crude oil prices limit importation of 
oil stocks. 
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D . Budget, Money and Prices 
For the first nine months of the y e a r , growth in 
consumer prices was at 12.5 percent, a deceleration from the 
first semester rate of 13.0 percent. Higher inflation rates 
in the first quarter reflected the full effects of measures 
and events which took place in the latter half of 1989, 
particularly the increase in minimum wages, the oil price 
hike on November 30, 1989, and the consequent adjustments in 
electricity and water rates. The fuel, light and water 
account thus posted the highest average inflation rate of 
23.5 percent for the first nine months. This was followed 
by the services index whose movements were influenced by the 
increase in transport fares and tuition fee hikes in schools 
beginning schoolyear 1990-91. The housing and repairs index 
likewise posted double digit growth of 14.1 percent as 
lumber and cement prices and rental rates of houses and 
apartments increased. Supply bottlenecks due to bad weather 
conditions as well as distribution problems in Metro Manila 
following the earthquake occasioned the 10.8 percent 
increase in the food, beverages and tobacco index. 
Full year average inflation is expected to reach 12.8 
percent as adjustments in crude oil prices triggered a round 
of increase in utilities and transport costs. Higher 
inflation rates are also expected in the latter part of the 
year due to the 7.5 percent depreciation of the peso for the 
first nine months which jacked up the prices of imported 
inputs and consumption goods. 
In response to the accelerating inflation in early 1990 
and in an effort to meet the March program targets in the 
M E P , monetary policy in the first quarter was generally 
contractionary. Increased issuance of treasury bills, 
increases in the rediscounting rates from 12 percent in June 
1989 to 13 percent in February 1990, and an increase in the 
reserve requirement against deposit liabilities from 20 
percent to 21 percent were the measures concretizing this 
contractionary stance. As a result, the level of domestic 
liquidity as of end June 1990 represented a mere 3.8 percent 
increase from the end-December level. Further, base money 
and money levels declined by about three percent from their 
end-December levels. 
The tight money situation partly explains the increase 
in average nominal interest rates for the first semester. 
Rates on Treasury Bills peaked at 25.2 percent in April 
after the mopping up operations of the Central Bank, but 
decreased a bit starting in May. The participation of GSIS 
and SSS in the regular weekly auction of T-bills served to 
dampen speculation on the rates to a certain degree. This 
general trend was followed by time deposit rates and secured 
loan rates. 
14 
The latest preliminary data, however, show a sharp 
increase in Treasury bill rates for the month of September. 
From the July level of 20.9 percent, the 91-day rate 
increased to 27.8 percent in August and jumped to 28,3 
percent in September. This has brought the simple average 
of the rates to about 22.9 percent for the first three 
quarters. The rate increase proceeded as the market reacted 
to CB pronouncements of tighter money growth due to expected 
higher inflation rate and the failure of the monetary 
authorities to meet the prescribed benchmarks for base money 
in the second and third quarters of the year. 
The more fundamental reason for the sharp increases in 
Treasury Bill rates has been the widening budget deficit of 
the National Government (NG) . Latest data as of September 
indicate a P32.4 billion deficit, way above the P18.9 
billion programmed for the whole year under the December 
1989 IMF program. Revenues stood at P125.2 billion while 
expenditures stood at P157.6 billion. 
The factors explaining the widening budget gap could be 
partly gleaned from the first semester figures. Actual 
disbursements of the national government for the first 
semester was five percent in excess of the program. 
Overspending on interest payments and net lending 
contributed to the increase. Net lending to corporations 
remained positive as NG advances to corporations were used 
to finance required payments for corporate debt papers 
tendered by the commercial banks. Further, the programmed 
transfer of about P5.1 billion in CB liabilities to the 
National Government also contributed to the budget gap. 
Aside from the delay in the disbursement of expected 
inflows, i.e., part of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) which 
is tied to the implementation of EO 413, the failure to 
legislate and implement several revenue measures also 
contributed to the budget gap. Two measures were 
implemented, i.e., R.A. 6965 which was passed last 18 June 
1990 to impose higher excise taxes on cigarettes and liquor 
and E.O. 399 which was issued on 24 April 1990 to direct 
cash dividends declared by government-owned or -controlled 
corporations to be increased . from at least five to ten 
percent. However, several others are on hold. The package 
of measures whose revenue effects were included in the 
reckoning of the programmed budget deficit for the whole 
year include: (a) the gradual phase out of the Gross 
Receipts Tax (GRT) * (b) reduced premium tax on insurance 
companies; (c) affluent consumption tax/ (d) tdx on casino 
gameships; (e) tax on softdrinks; (f) revised taxation on 
business and professional income,' (g) privileye tax on 
business establishments; (h) tax amnesty on customs duties; 
(i) incentives to the BIk; and (j) excess energy consumption 
tax. For the increase in business and professional tax 
alone, revenue foregone amounted to P2.1 billion. Value 
added tax collections continue to be low as the lack of 
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personnel beset the BIR and shortfalls in APT collections 
were realized. 
Efforts of the government to cushion the impact of 
higher oil prices brought on by the Middle East crisis have 
had their cost. In shifting from an ad valorem tax base for 
petroleum products to specific tax base, the rates imposed 
were not revenue neutral. This meant a loss of almost P6 
billion for the national government exacerbating the 
government'.s budget woes. 
Despite additional expenditure cutting measures in the 
latter part of the year, the budget deficit is expected to 
exceed substantially the programmed level. Under 
performance of trade taxes is also expected as level of 
imports drop due to foreign exchange constraints. Congress 
has also sent strong signals that no new tax measures will 
be legislated. These pressures are expected to contribute 
to a further widening of the budget gap with the consequent 
increase in interest rates. 
E . External Sector Performance; Exports, Imports, 
Financial Flows, External Debt and Debt Service 
Total exports and imports in real peso terms rose by 
7.0 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively. These represent 
a marked deceleration in their year-ago levels of 14.1 
percent for exports and 31.0 percent for imports. 
Accounting for the sharp deceleration in merchandise export 
growth from 16.0 percent to a mere 4.2 percent were the 
slowdowns registered for large volume export items like 
semi-conductors and electronic microcircuits (4.8 percent, 
from 20.7 percent), garments (9.3 percent, from 13.2 
percent), and copper concentrates (-1.78 percent from 2.7 
percent) . Viewed on a quarterly basis, declines were 
actually posted in the second quarter for these export 
commodities. The problems which have beset the manufacturing 
sector, i.e., high wages and power outages seem to be more 
felt with respect to the manufacture of these export items. 
On the demand side, the slowdown in export growth can 
also be attributed to the current deceleration in world 
economic growth as many of the world's economies have 
adopted contractionary monetary policies to arrest 
inflation. First semester US GNP growth, for instance, has 
tapered to 2.0 percent from 3.2 percent in the same period 
last year. Decrease in export prices and the continued 
overvaluation of the peso have also served as disincentives. 
Further, confidence on the ability of domestic manufacturers 
to meet delivery deadlines may have been eroded by the 
unstable political environment following the December 1989 
coup, thereby decreasing the inflow of foreign investments 
in export-oriented industries and reducing the amount of 
export orders. 
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Merchandise imports, on the other hand, grew by 13.4 
percent which is lower than the 20.7 percent registered 
during the same period last year. Substantial rice imports 
raised cereal and cereal products growth to 51.4 percent. 
Expansion in capital goods imports, particularly those to 
augment domestic power supply and those to improve 
telecommunications facilities also contributed to import 
growth. 
Such trends translated to a faster growth of the value 
of imports relative to that of exports, yielding a trade 
balance of $-1873 million in the first semester. This is 
62.7 higher than that registered for the same period in 
1989. This shortfall, together with lower net inward 
transfers, served to further widen the current account 
deficit to $1229 million from $767 million last year or from 
3.7 percent to about 5.3 percent of GNP. 
The trend was registered despite the improvement of the 
nonmerchandise trade account. Forty one percent growth in 
personal income reflecting higher inflows of worker 
remittances and a 6.4 percent reduction in interest payments 
are the major factors explaining the $366 million surplus in 
net nonmerchandise trade account. Lower interest payments 
came about due to the decline in foreign interest rates and 
foreign exchange liabilities. The debt buyback program of 
the government serves to explain the latter. 
The surplus of $262 million for the nonmonetary capital 
account was also due to effects of the debt buyback schemes. 
A notable increase in revaluation gains was made due to the 
discounts realized under the debt cash buyback in January 
and the operation of other debt reduction schemes. Net 
inflows of short-term capital increased due to higher net 
availment of official and development assistance. The net 
medium and long term loan account weakened as increased loan 
availments arising from higher inflows from bilateral and 
multilateral sources and from inflows of new money from 
foreign commercial banks ($482 million) were overshadowed by 
higher loan repayments following the redemption of public 
sector debt ($1.34 billion) under the debt buyback operation 
in January. Net foreign investments also declined as 
capital withdrawals increased by almost five times and as 
debt equity conversions were suspended. 
The stronger performance of the nonmonetary capital 
account resulted in balance-of-payments deficit of US$231 
million for the first semester. This was an improvement 
compared to the $384 million deficit recorded for the same 
period last year. 
Growth in merchandise exports is expected at 3.8 
percent for the whole year. While the substantial 
depreciation of the peso should boost our competitiveness in 
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international markets, increases in wages and imported 
inputs undermine this trend. Even if exporters are given 
priority in dollar allocations for imports, the still 
limited foreign exchange hampers the importation of inputs. 
The destruction brought about by the earthquake to the 
Baguio Export Processing Zone would seriously impair the 
ability of semiconductor exports to post higher growth for 
the rest of the y e a r . Merchandise exports in dollar terms 
will therefore reach about 58.06 billion for the whole y e a r . 
Import growth is expected to reach 12.8 percent 
although merchandise imports would achieve slower growth of 
13.3 percent. The high price of foreign exchange coupled 
with its relative scarcity have proven to be effective 
deterrents. The postponement of the implementation of EO 
413, which could have cushioned the impact on import costs 
due to the tariff reductions therein, also provided a 
disincentive to import. Merchandise imports are expected to 
reach $12.1 billion dollars by year end. 
By year end, therefore, the current account deficit 
would reach about $3.1 billion or 6.8 percent of GNP. The 
balance of payments will turn to a deficit of $873 million. 
As of end August, gross international reserves of the 
Central Bank stood at $2.1 billion or about 2.0 months worth 
of imports (based on preliminary July figures). Drawdowns 
on the second tranche from commercial creditors boosted 
international reserves. 
Total foreign exchange liabilities as of April 1990 
stood at $26,140 million or 5.3 percent drop from the end 
1989 level. 
International reserves at year end is expected to be at 
a level equivalent to about 2.1 months worth of imports. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR 1991 AND 1992 
Economic performance in the next two years largely 
depends on the manner by which the present economic crisis 
is resolved. Domestic economic policy and external events 
will play the major roles with political developments also a 
significant, albeit unpredictable factor. In a sense, 
because of the predicament the Philippine economy finds 
itself in, this study has become less an exercise in 
projecting numbers than an attempt in predicting the 
conditions that will yield these numbers. 
Section IV will outline the recent moves made by the 
administration toward economic reform. The recent crisis has 
caused this program to be derailed and this would 
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probably be reconciled with an IMF-type macroeconomic policy 
package. The latter will have as its main objectives the 
reduction in the current account deficit and the government 
budget deficit. 
The forecasts in this study are conditioned on the 
following developments that are envisioned to take place in 
the short-term: 
1. The government will "strive mightily through artful 
liberalization programs, to resolve the internal crisis by 
raising the foreign financing required." 3/ The program 
will contain the usual conditionalities but not unlike 
previous experience, this study expects no significant 
change in the structure of protection. 
2. Instead, the first item that will adjust (for 
reasons to be explained in the next section) would be the 
exchange rate. Actually, this has already materialized (the 
exchange rate fell from 25.75 to 28 last 1 November) but 
some sectors still advocate for a further depreciation of 
the peso. On a year-to-year basis, a relatively sharp 
devaluation to the tune of 17-20 percent is expected. 
3. Foreign financing will be made available to tide 
the economy at least over the next year. This implies that 
there would be no drastic steps toward a unilateral default 
and the government will continue to meet its obligations on 
external debt. 
4. To reduce the deficit, the government will resort 
to expenditure-cutting measures and reserve tax increases as 
a last resort. 
5. The military conflict in the Middle East makes it 
difficult to predict the level of world oil prices in 1991. 
This study assumes a range of $25-$30 per barrel. If the 
Gulf War is brought to a quick and decisive end by the 
coalition forces, the price range would surely decline. 
Prospects of a protracted conflict are too horrible to 
contemplate. 
6. Economic growth in the industrialized countries 
will slacken. 
7. Finally, there is enough reason to believe that the 
Aquino government will survive the remaining two years of 
its term. Elections will thus be held as scheduled in 1992. 
In the unlikely event of a nonconstitutional change in 
_3/Montes (1990), p . 29. 
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government, the prospects for the short-term would not be 
altered considerably, granted of course, that the transition 
would not be a drawn-out process which is the more probable 
scenario. 
A * Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance 
The economy will undergo a period of stabilization and 
the brunt of effects will be felt in 1991. As a result, 
growth will continue to be sluggish with GNP posting an 
increment-of 1.8 percent. GDP growth will be slightly higher 
at 2.2 percent. It should be emphasized that the economy 
will not experience a tailspin like it did in 1984-85. 
While the devaluation would cause a sharp increase in 
prices, it would have beneficial effects on exports and ease 
the pressure on interest rates. Hence the industry sector, 
which is usually the hardest hit by a devaluation, would 
still manage to post a growth of roughly 2.2 percent. The 
implicit assumption, of course, is that the power situation 
will be normal. Industrial projects like the CALABARZON and 
the second phase of the Light Rail Transit system would be 
additional sources of growth in this sector. 
Barring another major drought, the agriculture sector 
will continue its recovery and register a 2.6 percent growth 
rate. The more realistic exchange rate should also provide 
an incentive for increased agricultural production since an 
overvalued currency has always penalized the agriculture 
sector in favor of the industry sector. The services sector 
would follow the trend in both the industrial and 
agriculture sectors ands register a 2.0 percent .growth rate. 
The jump in prices will discourage consumption 
expenditures such that the growth in private consumption 
expenditure will fall to 5.2 percent. Government consumption 
will decline by 2.8 percent reflecting the continuing 
austerity programs. Total investment spending will also 
slow down to 2.3 percent partly as a result of higher crude 
oil prices. Historical data show that during the two 
previous oil shocks, the increased fuel bill crowded out 
importation of machinery and capital goods. Lower interest 
rates will cushion the drop in investment; in addition, the 
rehabilitation of the earthquake-ravaged areas will peak in 
1991, preventing government construction from dropping off 
more than .8 percent. 
The year 1992. will only be marginally better than 1991. 
Election spending, which has the potential to be the most 
expensive presidential campaign in Philippine history will 
provide the additional boost to economic activity. GNP and 
GDP growth will be 3.9 and 4.0 percent, respectively. The 
agriculture sector will continue to lead the way with a 3.2 
percent increment. Industry will have sufficiently recovered 
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and expand by 5.2 percent while the performance of the 
services sector would continue to be mediocre a 3.7 
percent growth. 
Consumer spending will likely be the main beneficiary 
of election spending. Total consumption will increase by 
5.2 percent compared to 4.3 percent in 1991. Following the 
cue of increased economic activity, investment will likewise 
post a higher growth rate at 4.9 percent. 
B . Employment 
Due to the economic slowdown, the full time equivalent 
unemployment rate will increase both in 1991 and 1992. The 
projected figures are 22.7 percent and 24.1 percent, 
respectively. On a sectoral basis, the industrial employment 
will experience a decrement in 1991 while employment in 
agriculture will remain constant. Only employment in the 
services sector will register an increase in 1991. In 
contrast, all three sectors will employ more workers in 
1992. The increase in the unemployment rate can thus be 
traced to the rise in the labor force participation rate. 
The continued joblessness of some of the overseas workers 
from the strife-torn part of the Middle East would also be a 
contributory factor. 
C . Savings and Investment 
Despite the decline in the projected investment growth 
rates, the savings-investment gap is expected to widen. 
This can be traced to the large devaluation which would lead 
to an increase in the peso equivalent of net outflows from 
the country. It is also discouraging to note that the 
achievement of a 20 percent investment-GDP ratio will be 
retarded following the adjustment process that the economy 
must undergo. Last year, it was predicted that the economy 
would reach this threshold level by 1991. 
There should not be much difficulty in filling the gap 
between domestic savings and investment. Aside from the 
foreign financing due from creditors, the government is 
planning to revamp its rules on foreign investment. 
Projections from the Central Bank indicate that net direct 
foreign investment will approximate its 1987-88 values in 
1991 and 1992. Moreover, studies have shown capital flight 
(or more broadly, private foreign asset accumulation) to be 
sensitive to the expected rate of devaluation. A more 
realistic exchange rate should alleviate the savings-
investment gap by encouraging the return of capital flight. 
D . Budget, Money and Prices 
Inflation will definitely be higher in 1991 than in 
1990. Largely because of the expected devaluation, the 
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inflation rate will jump to 17 percent in 1991. This figure 
also incorporates a higher wage rate and the December 1990 
increase in domestic fuel prices. Inflation should taper off 
in 1992 but will remain in the double digit level, about 13 
percent. Pressure from the budget deficit will hamper the 
efforts of the country's economic managers to bring 
inflation below 10 percent. Increased money circulation 
brought about by the election spending will also push prices 
in the upward direction. 
Discretionary monetary policy will continue to remain 
tight. The expansion in the monetary base would be mainly 
due to revaluation effects and losses of the Central Bank on 
their forward exchange transactions. The real interest rate, 
however, should be lower as the large devaluation in the 
exchange rate would eliminate the necessity for indirect 
Central Bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
Total domestic liquidity is forecasted to grow by 11 percent 
in 1991 and 17 percent in 1992. 
Despite sincere efforts by the government to reduce 
spending, it still has to contend with the primary source of 
the bloated deficit, which lies in the mounting interest 
payments on both domestic and foreign debt. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to recommend measures to deal 
with this problem, it continues to subscribe to the notion 
that there is still room to improve current policies 
designed to deal with the external debt problem. 
The budget deficit will continue to be the focal point 
of policy debate in the next year. No draconian measures to 
reduce interest payments is expected; hence, the deficit 
will continue to deteriorate, posting a level equivalent to 
3.6 percent of GNP in 1991 and 3.2 percent in 1992. 
E. External Sector Performance: Exports, Imports, 
Financial Flows, External Debt and Debt Service 
The sizable devaluation in the exchange rate will 
generate textbook effects in the external sector - imports 
will slow down and exports will grow at a slightly faster 
rate, both variables being measured in real peso terms. The 
concomitant wage increases and inflation, however, would 
prevent exports from posting a higher increment. The 
improvement in the peso current account would be aided by 
the five percent across the board tax slapped on all 
imports. With the higher fuel bill, however, the current 
account deficit will only improve slightly to $2.6 billion 
in 1991 from $3.2 billion in 1990. Unless world crude oil 
prices will decline, the current account will show no 
significant contraction although it is expected to dip to 
$2.1 billion in 1992. 
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Based on the assumptions enumerated above, it is 
expected that the current account deficit would be covered 
by appropriate movements in the capital account. Since the 
latter is exogenous in the model used for this exercise, 
some numbers provided by the government's planning agencies 
were adopted. The figures indicate substantial inflows from 
new money and debt rescheduling which, if incorporated in 
the model, yield a BOP surplus of $1.3 billion in 1991 and 
$1.1 billion in 1992. This is a marked improvement from the 
projected deficit of $873 million in 1990. 
There will be minimal progress in reducing the external 
debt overhang. Because of the need for new money to cover 
the higher oil bill, the external debt will increase in the 
short-run. The debt-service ratio, however, will hover 
between 25-30 percent which is still a relatively manageable 
level. The next administration will be faced with the 
unenviable task of dealing simultaneously with an external 
debt which would be roughly equal to the level in 1985 and a 
public sector domestic debt burden which more than doubled 
during the period 1985-89. 
IV. MAJOR ECONOMIC POLICIES, REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
With the economy beginning to show signs of faltering, 
the Cabinet, as early as the second quarter of 1990, 
initiated a set of socio-economic and financial measures for 
the remaining years of the Aquino administration (1990-92). 
The major proponent of this package, current Secretary of 
Finance Jesus Estanislao, described it as a "new economic 
program" (henceforth to be referred to as NEP) formulated 
independent of any IMF influence. While the major thrust of 
the NEP seems to be consistent with previous reform 
programs, 4/ it is not without its shortcomings. These have 
been concisely explained in a paper written by a group of 
faculty members of the University of the Philippines, School 
of Economics (UPSE). Their basic argument runs as follows: 
"To be fair to the issues themselves and to the 
public, the NEP should explain: first, an analysis 
of the problems faced; second, the process by 
which the proposed program is supposed to work; 
and third, the probable effects these might have 
on various sectors of society, especially those 
the program intends to help....Nowhere has a clear 
framework of analysis been provided that would 
4/See for example Alburo, Bautista et al. (1986) . 
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show precisely why and how the specific measures 
proposed would achieve the aims stated." 5/ 
One could refer to this document and other recent 
papers for an analysis of the roots of the present economic 
malaise. 6/ The subject of this section is simply to 
present recent policy measures and probable adjustments in 
the future. Concluding this section would be a discussion 
of development issues. 
A . Trade and Industrial Policy 
The centerpiece of the NEP was a set of measures aimed 
at cutting and streamlining import tariffs. This package 
evolved into an executive order (EO 413) which was approved 
by the Cabinet and the President and was actually ready for 
implementation last September 1990. EO 413, however, has 
been temporarily shelved following stiff opposition from a 
group of local businessmen, reflecting the deep-seated 
protectionist sentiment of the segment that holds power and 
influence. This policy debate is a throwback to the issue 
of trade liberalization that has been ongoing since 1974 and 
the Tariff Reform Program initiated in 1980. Unfortunately, 
nothing concrete has been resolved and this has not been 
helped by the haphazard implementation of the import 
liberalization program (Montes 1989) which was continued in 
1986 after being temporarily put on hold during the economic 
recession in 1983-85. Given the existing economic 
uncertainty, it is doubtful whether EO 413 will be 
implemented in full. 
Even before the Middle East crisis, the government had 
intended to deregulate oil prices. This was because the Oil 
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), which has been administered 
as a subsidy, could not be maintained as such without 
adverse effects on the budget deficit. This policy proposal 
was overtaken by events in the Middle East, putting the 
government in a dilemma. Deregulation of the oil price 
would have resulted in a quantum leap of fuel prices which 
would have had dire consequences on the economy especially 
in terms of social unrest. To work itself out of this 
quandary, the government stuck to its original plan (i.e., 
it was part of the NEP) to move away from, a strict ad 
valorem tax on oil to a specific tax which was designed to 
moderate the increase in fuel prices. The latter have been 
increased twice over a span of one month but this does not 
5/Alonzo, Balisacan et a l . (1990), p . 2. 
6/See also Dohner and Intal (1989), Montes (1990), 
Montes (198y), and also de Dios (1984). The latter focuses 
on the 1983-85 BOP crisis although much of the analysis is 
still relevant today. 
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seem to be enough as oil companies have requested an 
additional increase. 
In order to attract more foreign investment, the 
administration is contemplating amendments on rules 
governing this area. These include a relaxation of ownership 
requirements and a redirection of the role of the Board of 
Investments towards investment and trade promotion away from 
its present allocative function. 
B. Financial Policies and Reforms 
The NEP contains major reforms that have been proposed 
for the financial sector. If implemented immediately, these 
would have a positive impact on the economy especially in 
terms of savings mobilization. Among these are: 
Delineation of rules on liberalizing bank entry in 
order to foster competition in the banking industry; 
Abolition of the five percent gross receipts tax and 20 
percent witholding tax on interbank deposits as a means 
of further reducing financial intermediation costs; and 
Lowering of required reserves over time and the phasing 
out of the agri-agra requirement. 
In April 1990, the Central Bank liberalized its rules 
on new banks and bank branching activities although there 
are reports that bankers still find these restrictive. 
C . Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Policy 
Recent economic discussions have focused on two matters 
that need to be addressed with the utmost urgency: the 
mounting public debts and the trade and current account 
deficits. These twin macroeconomic imbalances could be 
attributed to flaws in policies implemented during the 
Aquino administration. 
The Central Bank has regularly intervened in the 
foreign exchange market in order to prop up the value of the 
peso. This resulted in a currency overvaluation making 
importation more attractive and discouraging exports. The 
ballooning trade deficit mitigated the Central Bank's 
ability to effectively intervene leading to a sharp 
depreciation of the peso in the third quarter of 1990. The 
NEP actually stipulates that the Central Bank will maintain 
a flexible exchange rate policy designed to make the 
Philippine industry more competitive, a policy which, 
however, does not deviate significantly from past 
pronouncements. 
25 
Monetary policy has been tight since 1983 owing to the 
obsession of the Central Bank to control inflation* As a 
result, the real rate of interest, together with the reserve 
requirement ratio, has remained at very high levels. The 
high interest rate policy of the Central Bank is also aimed 
at easing pressure on the peso by keeping asset-holders from 
shifting from pesos into dollars. 
The NEP recognizes the detrimental effects of high 
interest rates on the economy especially investment 
activities. The NEP mandates that: 7/ 
"We will go beyond the traditional over-reliance 
on monetary tools, i.e., to squeeze down monetary 
supply, to tolerate high interest rates, and to 
allow economic growth to decelerate, instead, we 
will allow for a steady moderate growth of money 
supply, and to stay within the monetary growth 
track, and to prevent slippages from such a track 
to build up. This is the environment within which 
we can undertake initiatives to bring down the 
structures of our interest rates." 
This proposed monetary rule, however, still has to be 
specified. 
D . Public Sector Reforms 
Interest payments on foreign and domestic debt have 
been the chief reasons behind the widening government 
deficit. The NEP recognizes this aspect when it 
categorically states that "domestic debt service reduction 
must be undertaken with as much determination as foreign 
debt reduction" 8/ although it remains "enigmatically silent 
on the foreign debt issue." 9 / Moreover, the strategy to 
reduce domestic debt service is not clearly specified. 
High interest payments on domestic* debt. follow from the 
high interest rates that have persisted after the 1983-85 
recession. Following a model of Cohen (19^87), this policy 
7/As stated in the 15 June 1990 memorandum of Secretary 
Estanislao to the President on the "Strategic Approach to 
Implementation of our Socio-economic and Financial Measures, 
1990-92." 
^/"Report on General Agreements: Special Cabinet 
Meeting," Business Star, 2 June 1990. 
11/Alonzo, Balisacan et al. (1990), p. 10. 
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option was intended to contain the trade balance in lieu of 
a sharp devaluation. The latter alternative has been 
eschewed by the Central Bank primarily to enable the 
government to meet its external debt obligations and also to 
minimize its losses on forward exchange cover transactions. 
Within the context of the first reason, the Central Bank has 
essentially substituted domestic debt for foreign debt. 10/ 
Another interesting and controversial development has 
been the transfer of fiscal related liabilities in the books 
of the Central Bank to the national government. This has 
also contributed to the increase in the 1990 deficit of the 
national government. The move has generated controversy 
because of the explanation behind the transfer. The Central 
Bank argues that these liabilities properly belong to the 
national government, that they were a result of fiscal-
related measures. The faculty members of CJPSE, however, 
have pointed out that these losses arose from inappropriate 
monetary and exchange-rate policies. First, there are the 
losses on forward cover operations borne by the Central 
Bank; and second, the deficits have also arisen from the 
high interest cost of the "Jobo" bills, which were issued in 
1984-85 to mop up excess liquidity and to curb 
inflation. 11/ 
In order to narrow the deficit, the executive branch of 
government has opted for the easier path by proposing an 
increase in taxes and a similar increase in rates on 
services provided by government-owned and -controlled 
corporations (e.g., National Power Corporation). The former 
strategy has been opposed by the Congress which instead 
advocates for a cut in expenditures. At the present time, 
there has been no agreement on the actual deficit cutting 
measures. A strategy to increase taxes leaves much to be 
desired in view of the relatively low levels of the tax 
effort ratio which implies that there is still much room to 
increase revenues by way of stricter implementation of 
existing tax measures. As for the increase in utility 
rates, the GOCCs could instead focus on greater efficiency 
in their operations (for example, increase their collection 
effort) not to mention the inflationary impact of the former 
strategy. 
On the other hand, a cut in expenditures will surely be 
met with stiff resistance especially from cause-oriented 
10/The theme of Reaganomics was essentially "Buy Now, 
Pay Later." Perhaps the motto of the CB during the term of 
Jobo Fernandez was "Pay Foreign Debt Now and Domestic Debt 
Later." The problem is that "later" ca:r.e' sooner than was 
expected. 
11/Alonzo, Balisacan et al. (1990), p. 10. 
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groups which invariably bring the issue of huge external 
debt payments into the picture. Another disadvantage of this 
option is that a disproportionate share of the reduction in 
expenditures would likely fall on maintenance and operating 
costs. This would accelerate the depreciation of 
infrastructure facilities which are already in an 
unsatisfactory state. 
This paper ends this part by assessing the future of 
the NEP. Given the existing economic problems and the 
depletion of the country's foreign exchange reserves, this 
policy package will probably be reconciled with an IMF-type 
macroeconomic program. The first thing to give would likely 
be the exchange rate since a devaluation would hit several 
birds with one stone. Imports will decline, the pressure on 
interest rates will be reduced, and there will be a positive 
effect on exports. Of course, the government will have to 
contend with the inflationary consequences although it would 
make things less difficult if the devaluation were a one-
shot deal. A watered-down version of EO 413 would be 
approved which essentially means that the protectionist 
structure will remain as is. Things could be different 
though come the GATT negotiations in the Uruguay Round. 
The financial measures would most likely be implemented 
in toto. With the devaluation, monetary policy could be 
relaxed somewhat; hence, the reason for the decline in real 
interest rates. The government deficit would still be the 
thorniest issue since it is intertwined with the matter of 
external debt obligations. Probably as a last resort, taxes 
would have to be raised. As for the matter of a unilateral 
default, such a move will probably not arise after the 
government receives guarantees of new money at subsidized 
rates. 
E. Development Issues 
Last y e a r , the need for structural reform as the single 
most important issue that faces the Philippine economy was 
cited (Yap 1990). Despite the varying circumstances due to 
the crises that hit the country, this proposition remains 
fixed. Some sectors see the need for an immediate 
stabilization program in order to tame the twin deficits. 
While one cannot argue with this objective, it must be noted 
that the net capital outflows that have existed since 1980 
have contributed to both the current account deficit and the 
government's deficit. Structural reforms would also include 
the correction of past policy mistakes that partly accounted 
for these macroeconomic imbalances. Within a milieu of 
continuing net resource outflows, however, it would be 
virtually impossible to carry out structural reforms. The 
dangers of subscribing fully to IMF-type prescriptions lie 
in the social unrest that this will foment. The nationwide 
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ion program. Moreover, it is important to 
the possible microeconomic responses to 
nee this would spell the difference between 
ure of the adjustment programs (Montes 
translates into the need for an 
policy that is anchored on a sound science 
development program. The benefits that 
derive from such a reform package should 
fied in order to lessen any skepticism that 
While the exigency for structural reform remains a 
constant, the nature of the reforms may be affected by 
changes in the global economic environment. There is a 
tendency to define economic efficiency along the lines of an 
"export-oriented" economy. Such a proclivity would 
definitely be modified if the parameters of the 
international financial system would shift. Economic 
globalization is giving way to regionalized trading blocs 
which tend to complement rather than conflict with the 
existing world trading system. This configuration would 
diminish the chances of a country obtaining a mandate to 
install its currency as an international unit of account and 
subsequently mismanaging this privilege. While the 
development of this type of international financial system 
is at its incipient stage, it would most likely advance at a 
very rapid rate. 
It would therefore be a wise move for policymakers to 
anticipate the "revolution" that will occur in the global 
economy and conceptualize the structural reforms along this 
line. 
V . CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the political and nonpolitical crises 
that hit the country - referring to the events described in 
the first paragraph of this paper - four years of 
procrastination has made the bitter pill of economic reform 
more difficult to swallow. A year ago in this forum, this 
writer warned of the danger of a principle of simply 
"muddling through" which, if pursued, would cause 
policymakers to be overtaken by reality. To the credit of 
the Aquino administration, it did initiate moves toward more 
fundamental reform. Despite its drawbacks, the NEP does 
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recognize the need for the redistribution of economic 
opportunities which is a necessary component of any 
meaningful change in the present economic system. Reality, 
however, has already set in, hastened by the exogenous 
shocks that jolted the country and the threat of a global 
recession. It is not comforting to observe the government 
continue vacillating with regard to the design and 
implementation of appropriate adjustment policies in the 
face of these rapidly unfolding events. 
The next several months would put to an acid test the 
mettle of the Aquino government. Earlier, reference was made 
to the possibility that political fragmentation would prove 
to be the biggest obstacle to economic development* Indeed, 
if the present crop of leaders do not set aside their petty 
squabbles and personal ambitions, any worthy reform package 
would come to naught. This would increase the chances of 
the outbreak of widespread disturbances and even the risk of 
a nonconstitutional change in government. 
Then again, the present crisis could provide an 
opportunity for the various factions to settle their 
differences and instead focus on the problems that beset the 
country. It would take imaginative, bold, and selfless 
leadership to achieve political reconciliation and instill a 
greater deal of rationality in the system. Hopefully, the 
country does not have to wait until 1992 for this to 
materialize. 
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Table 2 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Est. 
1991 
Proj. 
1992 
Proj. 
Econoiic growth (Annual growth 
rate in constant prices, I) 
Agriculture 3.27 (1.02) 3.57 4.29 0.63 2.60 3.17 
Industry (2.08) 7.40 8.97 6.91 2,10 2.21 5.20 
Services 
(Public adninistration 
and defense) 
2.95 6.63 6.26 5.45 4.04 1.98 3.69 
GDP 1.42 4.60 6.37 5.61 2.48 2.22 4.05 
GDP and GNP in value terns 
(In billion pesos) 
In current market prices 
GDP 
National income 
627,13 
490.70 
708.37 
555.52 
825.85 
680.24 
964.00 
794.00 
1113.51 1318.91 1542.97 
In constant market prices 
GDP 
(1972=100) 
91.18 95.37 101.45 107.14 109.80 112.24 116.78 
Employment (Full tine 
equivalent) 
Uneaploynent rates (X) 22.78 21.40 
Mages (Index, 312.65 319.17 
unskilled labor) 
(1972=100) 
20.02 13.54 20.43 23.31 24.71 
379.75 453.97 492.70 573.32 634.87 
Table 3 
EXPENDITURES ON GDP 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Est. Proj, Proj. 
(In Billion doaestic 
currency in current 
larket prices) 
Total consuaption 523,432 584,553 676,352 793,561 986,318 1,281,858 1,432,898 
6ross capital foraation 81,186 113,718 143,256 179,714 283,397 257,287 316,461 
6ross fixed capital 
foraation 88,817 181,781 126,413 167,139 286,852 257,287 313,288 
Increase in stocks 289 11,937 16,643 12,575 (3,455) " 3,181 
Exports of goods 
and services 155,184 163,472 282,936 242,581 281,394 356,886 428,815 
(-) Iaports of goods 
and services 116,188 157,397 198,137 253,257 385*153 396,658 448,465 
Statistical discrepancy (16,325) 4,822 1,445 1,398 (56,298) (118,193) (174,623) 
Gross doaestic product 627,129 788,368 825,852 963,997 1,189,658 1,319,188 1,545,486 
Net factor incoae froa 
the rest of the world (12,426) (5,887) (2,982) (2,621) 3,651 (169) (2,421) 
Gross national product 614,783 783,361 822,878 961,376 1,113,381 1,318,939 1,543,865 
(As percent of 8DP) 
at constant prices 
Doaestic saving 1/ 17.98 16.97 17.15 16.67 13.92 12.28 11.22 
National saving 1/ 16.14 16.28 16.79 16.37 14.26 12.18 11.85 
Gross capital foraation 11. B9 14.23 15.78 17.86 16.89 16.90 17.04 
1/ Doaestic saving is defined as GDP ainus total consuaption, while national saving is 
defined as GNP ainus total consuaption. 
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Table 4 
INFLATION, HONEY SUPPLY AND 60VERNHENT BUDGET 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Est. Proj. Proj. 
1. Inflation 
Consumer prices (1972=180) 
Annual average index 749.61 778.85 846.21 935.89 1055.48 1234.55 1395.57 
End ninth index 
I Change 8.75 3.79 8.76 10.68 12.78 16.97 13.84 
Wholesale prices 
Annual average index 992.09 1082.21 1227.49 1359.25 1515.58 1891.32 2190.03 
End >onth index 
2. Honey supply (In billion 
pesos) it 
HI (narroHly defined toney) 42.66 52.09 59.55 78.53 87.17 100.30 115.25 
N2 (broadly defined toney) 136.27 155.63 192.41 250.17 294.82 344.10 399.93 
3. Government budget 
(In billion pesos) 
Revenue 79.25 103.21 112.90 152.70 179.13 216.12 244.84 
Tax 65.75 85.92 90.36 122.36 143.82 178.58 205.09 
Nontax 13.49 17.95 22.54 30.34 35.31 37.62 39*75 
Expenditure 113.67 119.47 133.18 172.00 223.90 263.10 294.30 
Current 46.95 58.14 66.78 145.20 182.50 203.50 222.20 
Development 14.02 17.33 16.27 22.80 33 • 47.70 52.90 
Overall surplus/deficit 5.49 2.30 2.46 2.08 4.02 3.56 3.21 
(As a Z of 6DP) 
a/ Old concept; does not include Land Bank of the Philippines reserve balances. 
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Table 5 
TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(In US* M) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Est. 
1991 
Proj. 
1992 
Proj. 
Merchandise: Exports fob 4,842 5,720 7,074 7,821 8,055 8,959 10,213 
Merchandise: Isports fob 5,044 6,737 8,159 10,419 12,114 12,811 13,481 
Trade balance (202) (1,017) (1,085) (2,598) (4,058) (3,851) (3,267) 
Services and transfers (net) 1,198 573 695 1,133 1,001 1,213 1,125 
Other goods, serv. and 
income, credit 3,791 3,454 3,592 4,586 4,726 5,164 5,550 
Other goods, serv. and 
income, debit 3,034 3,454 3,672 4,283 4,417 4,727 5,133 
Private unrequited transfers 
a) Workers' remittances 696 809 874 1,002 1,205 1,385 1,525 
Official unrequited transfers 
Current account 996 (444) (390) (1,465) (3,057) (2,638) (2,142) 
Memorandum iteas 
Exchange rate (per U.S. 
dollar: annual ave.) 20.39 20.57 21.10 21.74 24.23 28.50 30.00 
Terms of trade 109.60 103.90 157.10 81.90 - - -
Unit value index (exports) 
Unit value index (imports) 
(1985=100) period ave. 
116.60 
119,70 
124.20 
158.00 
138.20 
191.30 
155.00 
247.20 -
- -
Merchandise imports c.i.f. 5394.00 7188,00 8731.00 11171.00 
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Table 6 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
(In US* B) 
1986 1987 1988 - 1989 1998 
Est. 
1991 
Proj. 
1992 
Proj. 
External debt outstanding 28.26 28.65 27.92 27.62 28.22 38.5B 33.47 
Long-ten 22.88 24.86 24.15 23.67 22.91 25.26 28.33 
Short-ten 5.38 3.79 3.76 3.95 4.85 4.89 3.93 
Use of INF credit 
Others 
Debt-service payaents 1/ 2.94 3.81 3.88 3.13 3.83 3.46 3.81 
Principal repayaent 1.88 1.89 8.99 8.91 1.78 1.19 1.24 
Long-tera 
Short-ten 
Interest payaent on 
long-ten debt 1.94 1.91 2.81 2.22 2.14 2.27 2.57 
Debt-service ratio (!) 21 34. BB 32.88 28.28 25.28 38.27 27.75 24.61 
1/ After rescheduling 
2/ Scheduled payaent as a ratio of exports of goods and services. 
Table 7 
FINANCIAL FLONS 1/ 
(Net Receipt Basis) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1998 1991 1992 
Est. Proj. Proj. 
Official floMS 1,131.9 1,873.7 1,254.8 
Official development 
assistance (ODA) 955.8 778.2 854.3 
Grant 
Loans 
516.8 
439.9 
461.2 
389.8 
482.6 
451.7 
Other official flows 176.1 383.5 488.5 
Private flows (48.1) (225.6) 36.8 
Direct investaent 
Portfolio investment 
Export credit 
68.2 
188.5 
(288.8) 
77.7 
(169) 
(134.3) 
194.4 
17.2 
(287.9) 
Total receipts (net) 1,891.8 848.1 1,258.4 
Heaorandua items 
ODA commitments ,,183.1 1,874.1 1,878.4 
1/ OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial FIOHS to Developing Countries, July 1998. 
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